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Abstract 
The tool for predicting the onset of boundary layer transition from damage to and/or 
repair of the thermal protection system developed in support of Shuttle Return to Flight is 
compared to the STS-114 flight results.  The Boundary Layer Transition (BLT) Tool is part of a 
suite of tools that analyze the aerothermodynamic environment of the local thermal protection 
system to allow informed disposition of damage for making recommendations to fly as is or to 
repair.  Using mission specific trajectory information and details of each damage site or repair, 
the expected time of transition onset is predicted to help determine the proper aerothermodynamic 
environment to use in the subsequent thermal and stress analysis of the local structure.  The 
boundary layer transition criteria utilized for the tool was developed from ground-based 
measurements to account for the effect of both protuberances and cavities and has been 
calibrated against flight data.  Computed local boundary layer edge conditions provided the 
means to correlate the experimental results and then to extrapolate to flight.  During STS-114, 
the BLT Tool was utilized and was part of the decision making process to perform an 
extravehicular activity to remove the large gap fillers.  The role of the BLT Tool during this 
mission, along with the supporting information that was acquired for the on-orbit analysis, is 
reviewed.  Once the large gap fillers were removed, all remaining damage sites were cleared for 
reentry as is.  Post-flight analysis of the transition onset time revealed excellent agreement with 
BLT Tool predictions. 
Nomenclature 
C empirical curve coefficient 
M Mach number 
Re unit Reynolds number (1/ft) 
ReL length Reynolds number based on L 
p pressure (psi) 
T temperature (°R) 
x longitudinal distance from the nose (in) 
LRef model reference length from nose to body-flap hinge line (9.7 in) 
k roughness element height (in) 
KEQ equivalent roughness height from distributed TPS steps and gaps (in) 
x, y, z Shuttle coordinate system (in) 
L,W,D cavity dimensions, length, width, and depth (in) 
! model angle of attack (deg) 
" boundary layer thickness (in) 
# momentum thickness (in) 
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Re# momentum thickness 
Reynolds number 
Subscripts 
! freestream static 
conditions 
t1 reservoir conditions 
t2 stagnation conditions 
behind normal shock 
e local edge condition 
aw adiabatic wall 
w model surface 
tr transition onset 
inc incipient 
eff effective 
Introduction 
New analytic (engineering 
based) tools were developed to 
evaluate Shuttle Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) damage in concert with a new capability to 
conduct “on-orbit inspections and repair, when indicated,” as recommended by the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board’s (CAIB) final report1.  Figure 1 provides a graphic showing the damage assessment 
capability and new tools2 developed for the first Shuttle Return to Flight (RTF) mission, STS-114.  Several 
engineering teams independently developed, matured, and certified their tools for use by the Shuttle 
program in the time between the initiation of the RTF effort in December 2003 and STS-114 launch in July 
2005.  Collectively, these tools allow informed decisions to be made of TPS damage and whether the 
vehicle is safe to fly as is or to repair. 
One of the initial tools in the TPS damage analysis process is the boundary layer transition (BLT) 
Tool3, which was developed for predicting transition onset, thus establishing the proper heating 
environment (either laminar or turbulent) to use with the subsequent analyses listed in Fig. 1.  Using 
mission specific entry trajectory data (altitude, velocity, angle of attack, yaw, air density, air temperature, 
etc.), the BLT Tool determines the local boundary layer parameters at each critical damage site and thus the 
predicted time of transition onset based on the developed BLT empirical correlations.  The program is a 
Fortran code and can be run on most computer systems.  The experimental database used to develop the 
empirical correlations for the tool was based on simplified tripping elements and cavities on scaled wind 
tunnel models.4  Computational solutions at both wind tunnel and flight conditions were generated to 
develop the BLT correlation and then extrapolate to flight.5  The tool incorporates a database of computed 
boundary layer parameters that cover a range of nominal trajectories for entry and utilizes an interpolation 
scheme to extract specific local properties for determining the boundary layer transition onset during the 
entry trajectory from the observed damage and/or repair locations and geometries.  Calibration of the BLT 
Tool has been carried out by comparison of predicted transition results to several of the historical high 
Mach number flight cases.6  Due to the limited scope of the historical flight data, in particular the lack of 
detailed cavity and gap filler information prior to entry into the earth’s atmosphere, a larger uncertainty has 
been placed on this process until detailed and calibrated results are obtained in up-coming flights. 
The present paper provides a description of the use of the BLT Tool in support of RTF and a post-
flight analysis of the STS-114 data as direct feedback for tool calibration, and is intended as part of a series 
of six papers on boundary layer transition research for RTF.  The following five references are the 
companion papers.  Reference 2 provides an overview of the new tools brought on line in support of the 
aeroheating analysis for RTF.   Reference 3 provides an overview of the integrated effort that was involved 
with developing and certifying a BLT correlation methodology for estimating transition onset for the 
Orbiter windward surface on entry.  Reference 4 describes the experimental database that was obtained to 
support BLT Tool development for RTF.  Reference 5 discusses the boundary layer properties interpolation 
tool developed for both the BLT and Cavity Heating Teams.  And lastly, Ref. 6 reviews some of the 
historical Orbiter flight data utilized to calibrate the BLT Tool.   
 
Figure 1. Aerothermal mission support tools developed for the RTF 
damage assessment process  
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BLT Tool Overview 
The BLT Tool predicts transition onset on the windward surface during entry and was newly 
developed in support of RTF.  BLT prediction is based on mission specific trajectory and damage/repair 
(either cavity or protuberance) information that allows informed disposition of the damage sites.  The BLT 
criteria utilized for the tool were developed from ground-based measurements to account for the effect of 
both protuberances and cavities (see Ref. 4) and have been partially calibrated against flight data.  Using 
computed boundary layer edge conditions to correlate the results, specifically the momentum thickness 
Reynolds number over the edge Mach number and the boundary layer thickness, curve coefficients (C) of 
27, 100, and 900 were adopted to conservatively predict transition onset for protuberances based on height, 
and cavities based on depth and length, respectively (see Ref. 3).  The output of the tool is a determination 
of the predicted transition onset times for each damage site, which then allows selection of one of the pre-
flight developed aeroheating environments for use with the subsequent analyses (see Ref. 2).  The current 
tool provides mission support not previously captured by the original KEQ roughness criteria
7. 
The BLT Tool can be used pre-launch to assess flight trajectories with nominal roughness, in orbit to 
assist in damage disposition analysis, and for entry to predict transition onset times for locating airborne 
infrared (IR) measurement assets (for instance NASA WB-57 aircraft to be discussed subsequently). 
The Fortran program requires mission entry trajectory data (altitude, velocity, angle of attack, yaw, air 
density, air temperature, etc.) and damage site locations and dimensions to determine the local boundary 
layer parameters used for predicting transition onset for each damage site.  A companion tool, called the 
wedge tool (described in Ref. 6), is used to predict the zone of influence behind each damage/repair site, 
thus providing any potential interactions between the various damage sites. 
The BLT Tool is intended for use on the windward surface only.  The computational approach is 
presently limited to between Mach 6 and 20 (see Ref. 5) and the database for flight is additionally limited 
to the angle of attack bounds identified in the Shuttle Operational Data Book.  The use of this tool outside 
of these limits is not advised.  The present boundary layer transition methodology is based on scaled wind 
tunnel models and has only been partially compared to flight data with the highest Mach number at the time 
of transition onset of 18.  Due to the limited scope of the historical flight data in regards to detailed cavity 
and gap filler information prior to entry, a larger uncertainty should be placed on this process until detailed 
and calibrated results are obtained in up-coming flights. 
Mission Support 
Launch 
Space Shuttle Discovery launched from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center on July 26, 2005, shown in 
Fig. 2, ending a two-and-a-half year wait for 
the historic return to flight mission.  During 
this test mission, a variety of goals were 
accomplished while also learning some 
important lessons.  For instance, a large 
piece of insulating foam broke off the 
External Tank (ET) during ascent providing 
an indication of the difficulties associated 
with the elimination of debris sources.  The 
first of two Return-to-Flight missions, STS-
114 included new on-orbit maneuvers, tests 
of new equipment and procedures, and a 
first-of-its-kind spacewalking repair of the 
TPS.  Using the new Orbiter Boom Sensor 
System (OBSS), unprecedented up-close 
inspections of the TPS were acquired.  The 
OBSS is comprised of a set of instruments, 
including video and a Laser Dynamic Range 
Imager, on a 50-ft extension attached to the 
 
Figure 2. Launch of Discovery on July 26, 2005 during 
STS-114 
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Remote Manipulator System.  The collection 
of new data included, on flight day three, the 
first-ever "rendezvous pitch maneuver" 
(RPM) as the orbiter approached the 
International Space Station (ISS) for 
docking. 
Debris shedding from the ET during 
launch was the programs principal concern 
and much work was completed in 
preparation for this mission to improve 
launch imaging.  In fact, the RTF 
requirement to only launch during daylight 
hours was to increase visibility for imaging.1  
The ground-based long-range cameras were 
all improved and fine-tuned, NASA airborne 
assets (WB-57) were added, and new video 
systems were installed on-board the ET.  
The video feed from the ET showing the 
underside of the vehicle captured the 
dramatic and alarming large debris separation mentioned earlier (which contributed to the decision to delay 
the next RTF mission, STS-121).  Also the new ET camera provided an early indication of windward 
surface damage to the TPS (an image captured from the video is shown in Fig. 3), although it was not clear 
during the launch if the white spots observed on the TPS were due to tile damage or protruding gap fillers.  
Post-launch assessments have since identified that the circled white spot near the center of the image is one 
of the gap fillers that will be identified during the RPM.  The video shows that this gap filler was forced out 
during launch, perhaps due to the high acoustic loading (vibrations) during lift-off or the high dynamic 
loading (drag) that occurs approximately one minute after lift-off.  Also, the image shown in Fig. 3 
indicates the specific time (2 minutes, 5.71 seconds after liftoff) that the damage site on the nose landing 
gear door formed.  The left circle (of the two marked as TPS Damage) is tile material debris just after 
liberation from the surface (gone in the next image of the video) and the resultant cavity left behind on the 
door is within the circle to the right.  While the ET continues to be the primary debris source of concern as 
the program gets ready for the next mission, clearly other debris sources such tile or gap filler material from 
the Orbiter, should also be considered. 
Rendezvous Pitch Maneuver  
On Flight Day 3, a new procedure to acquire high-resolution images of the Orbiter to assess the state of 
the TPS after launch was performed.  After the initial approach to the Station, Discovery performed a slow 
pitch about the lateral axis while astronauts on-board ISS took photographs with high-resolution cameras 
(an example is shown in Fig. 4).  The pictures were then transmitted to the Damage Assessment Team 
(DAT) on the ground for processing and analysis.  Locations were determined from the tile layout and the 
dimensions were estimated, as indicated 
in Fig. 5 for the primary TPS damage sites 
for STS-114.  The naming convention 
shown identifies each damage site by the 
TPS zone number in which it resides, 
along with a sequential number based on 
the number of damages within each zone.  
Figure 4 also includes two inset 
photographs of the protruding gap fillers 
identified during the RPM.  The green 
markers shown in Fig. 5 identify the 
damage sites that were found to be less 
than the 2-in criteria (and thus too small to 
be a concern), while the red and orange 
locations indicate the sites with  
Figure 4. Gap fillers identified from RPM images 
 
 
Figure 3. View from new ET camera during launch of 
Discovery during STS-114 on July 26, 2005 
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dimensions greater than the 2-in, thus requiring further inspection using the OBSS laser scanning system2.  
The blue symbols indicate the gap filler sites that were also requested to be further imaged during the 
focused inspection process.  The three identified sites circled near the nose were expected to be the biggest 
concerns, from a BLT perspective, due to both the location and size of the damage. 
The aerothermal analysis process starts with the BLT assessment when the damage site information, 
from the DAT review of the RPM photographs, is released near the end of the third day.  Note the 
relatively large uncertainty associated with estimating the damage dimensions using long-range 
photographs, as indicated in Fig. 5.  The large uncertainty combined with the fact that no cavity depth 
information is provided by the RPM photos provides support for the request for detailed OBSS scan data.  
The OBSS attached to the end of Discovery’s robotic arm carried out a survey of select areas of the TPS 
near the end of flight day 4.  Table 1 provides a comparison of the estimated dimensions from the RPM 
analysis to the more accurate OBSS results (and then finally to the measurements made after landing, if 
available) for the primary damage sites shown in Fig. 5.  The original uncertainty associated with the RPM 
estimates were greatly reduced by the scans of the cavity sites, however the gap filler scans by the OBSS 
proved inconclusive.  As will be seen in the next section the large uncertainty associated with the gap filler 
protrusion height estimates had a significant impact on the eventual uncertainty associated with the BLT 
Tool prediction times (and ultimately on the decision to remove them). 
Table 1. Comparison of key damage site dimensions from multiple sources  
Damage Site Location (in) RPM Estimate (in) OBSS Scan (in) Ground Measurement (in) 
942-01 
X = 378.9 
Y = 13.6 
Z = 285.9 
L = 3.2 ± 0.25 
W = 0.8 ± 0.25 
L = 3.07 ± 0.06 
W = 0.72 ± 0.04 
D = 0.33 ± 0.04 
L = 3.07 
W = 0.71 
D = 0.30 
221-01 
X = 860.6 
Y = 124.4 
Z = 284.6 
L = 2.0 ± 0.25 
W = 0.7 ± 0.25 
L = 2.20 ± 0.04 
W = 0.85 ± 0.04 
D = 0.27 ± 0.04 
L = 2.0  
W = 0.8  
D = 0.4  
702-01 
X = 1377.2 
Y = -125.4 
Z = 268.76 
L = 2.5 ± 0.25 
W = 0.4 ± 0.25 
L = 2.39 ± 0.06 
W = 1.37 ± 0.05 
D = 0.19 ± 0.04 
L = 3.0  
W = 0.5  
D = 0.03  
751-01 
X = 1405.3 
Y = -253.9 
Z = 282.8 
L = 2.9 ± 0.25 
W = 0.4 ± 0.25 
N/A 
L = 3.5  
W = 0.25  
D = 0.1  
134-01 
X = 408.0 
Y = -25.4 
Z = 284.1 
k = 1.1 ± 0.3 Scan inconclusive Removed in orbit 
134-01 
X = 475.9 
Y = 59.4 
Z = 285.3 
k = 0.9 ± 0.2 Scan inconclusive Removed in orbit 
 
Figure 5. Damage sites identified from the RPM 
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BLT Analysis 
The aerothermal analysis, which was initiated on flight day 3, was required to be complete by flight 
day 6 for final review by the Mission Management Team (MMT).  Accounting for the time necessary to 
double check results and develop charts, the initial entire aerothermal assessment needed to be conducted 
within about 24 hours.  The following is the BLT analysis conducted in support of this process on the 
primary sites identified by the DAT and shown in Fig. 5.  The turbulent wedge spreading results6 shown in 
the subsequent figures are based on a 10-deg half angle spreading on the surface streamlines from a 40-deg 
angle-of-attack solution that conservatively shows potential downstream influence to other damage sites.  
BLT Tool output is plotted to show the critical dimension (height, length, or depth) predicted to cause 
transition onset for each site of interest as a function of time along the entry trajectory.  The estimated 
damage dimensions, including uncertainties, are located on the calculated allowable roughness dimension 
threshold to determine the time, and therefore the freestream Mach number, at which transition onset is 
predicted to occur.  Also shown on the BLT output plot are the times corresponding to Keq (see Ref. 7) 
values of 0.250-in (red line representing a Mach 18 transition) and 0.155-in (blue line representing Mach 
15 transition), which are the standard times of transition used pre-flight to generate the aeroheating 
environments for each mission.  Note that based on a combination of the computational approach 
(discussed in Ref. 3) adopted for the BLT Tool and the range of calibration flight cases, any transition 
times earlier than ~800s (Mach 20) is beyond the accepted range of the BLT Tool.  At the time of the tool 
development this limit seemed acceptable as the earliest transition Mach number previously was below 19 
(STS-28 and 73). 
For gap filler 134-01 (shown in Fig. 6), the location was found to be just within the portside attachment 
line (indicated by the outboard limit of the streamlines shown) such that the downstream influence of 
transition would be felt asymmetrically over a large portion of the windward surface and the wing leading 
edge on the port side.  Most importantly, the estimated height of this gap filler protrusion exceeded the 
previous worst-case protrusion (which was based on a post-flight measurement only) by nearly a factor of 
two.  Based on the output from the BLT Tool, this height and location corresponds to a very early transition 
time, roughly 450s (~Mach 25) with an uncertainty band (based on the uncertainty in the height estimation, 
±0.3-in, from the RPM photos) of roughly ±75s.  As mentioned previously, transition this early is outside 
the accepted limit for the tool, requiring extrapolation beyond both the computational and calibration 
ranges of the tool.  The impact of this will be further discussed in a subsequent section.  Note that the 
wedge tool shows that gap filler 134-01 will influence damage sites 702-01 and 751-01, and the analysis of 
these two sites had to account for these early transition onset times in the event that the gap fillers were left 
as is (eventually the decision was made to remove the gap fillers, also to be discussed subsequently). 
 
Figure 6. BLT assessment for gap filler 134-01 
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For gap filler 133-01 (shown in Fig. 7), the location was found to be just outside the starboard 
attachment line, and that based on the conservative estimate of 10-deg of turbulent spreading the 
downstream impact of transition would be felt asymmetrically over roughly the other half of the windward 
surface and the wing leading edge on the starboard side.  Further analysis of turbulent spreading lead to the 
conclusion that if the wedge half-angle was less than 7.5-deg (which is considered nominal for flight) then 
the turbulent wedge would likely not spread back within the attachment line, thereby having no effect on 
the windward surface or the wing leading edge.  However, this gap filler protrusion was also estimated to 
be nearly as large as 134-01, again nearly double the previous worst-case protrusion.  The initial output 
from the BLT Tool indicates that this height and location also corresponds to a very early transition time, 
roughly 600s (Mach 24) with an uncertainty based on the height estimation uncertainty only of roughly 
±75s.  This transition time is again outside the accepted range for the tool.  Note that the wedge tool results 
shows that gap filler 133-01 will influence damage sites 221-01, and the subsequent analysis had to account 
for potential for an early transition onset time. 
As mentioned previously, both gap fillers were scanned with the OBSS in hopes of reducing both the 
height and the estimation uncertainty.  Unfortunately, the gap filler scan results were inconclusive, so the 
initial prediction of onset time could not be updated.  An assessment of the reliability of these early 
transition predictions was conducted with a critical eye towards the degree of extrapolation.  The existing 
high Mach number flight data used to calibrate the tool were reexamined in hopes of identifying any 
method to quantify the level of uncertainty with the present results being so far beyond the tool’s range.  
An adjustment to the accepted calibration constant, based on the notion that the original STS-73 data had 
been misinterpreted provided a means to alter the predicted transition onset times to 745s (~Mach 22) and 
790 (~Mach 21) for 134-01 and 133-01, respectively (however with still a large uncertainty band ±Mach 
2.5).  The previous evaluation of STS-73 was based on the gap filler height measured on the runway, which 
was bent over such that the total height above the surface was 0.6-in, while when straightened the gap filler 
was 1.4-in high.  Using the unbent height along with the transition onset time for that flight provided an 
alternate calibration curve coefficient (C=50), which resulted in the adjustment to the predicted transition 
time.  Also, independent experts were consulted during the mission for outside opinions on these early 
transition time predictions from the BLT Tool.  Unfortunately, all independent assessments came back with 
roughly the same order-of-magnitude estimate for transition onset, providing a sanity check but little relief 
to the perceived conservatism of the BLT Tool.  A flight history review reveals that many gap fillers have 
been noted as bent over on the runway based on the post-flight inspections.  A spirited and healthy debate 
occurred over whether gap fillers this large might bend over or burn away early in the trajectory, thus 
reducing the protrusion height, and the transition Mach number, down towards the historical limit.  
Unfortunately, a structural assessment of the gap filler material response under aeroheating loads was not 
available during the mission to support or dismiss this speculation. 
 
Figure 7. BLT assessment for gap filler 133-01 
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The BLT Team also investigated damage site 942-01 during the mission, due its relatively large size 
and far-forward location.  A comparison of the lengths and widths listed for each cavity identified in Fig. 5 
distinguishes 942-01 as one of the larger cavities.  The location on the nose landing gear door, which was 
just inside of the starboard attachment line (as identified in the turbulent wedge plot shown in Fig. 8a) 
provided the potential to affect a large portion of the windward surface.  The initial RPM estimate, listed in 
Table 1, provided length (3.2 in) and width (0.8 in) only.  Based on the initial length estimate only, a 
transition time of 1225s was predicted.  When the new OBSS scan updates became available and the length 
was reduced to 3.07 in, the transition onset time prediction was modified to 1240s.  Also, OBSS provides 
the additional dimension not previously available, the depth.  Based on the depth of 0.33 in, a predicted 
transition onset time of 1245s was obtained.  Thus, if the gap fillers are removed, the predicted transition 
onset time would be relatively close to the nominal transition times for this vehicle (~Mach 8) based on the 
last damage site (known about during the mission) near the nose, site 942-01.  Note that based on the BLT 
Tool output for 942-01, the length or depth required to predict transition onset near Mach 18 (the red KEQ 
line) is approximately 14 and 1.6 inches, respectively. 
 
Figure 8a. BLT assessment for cavity site 942-01 based on length 
 
 
Figure 8b. BLT assessment for cavity site 942-01 based on depth 
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Extravehicular Activity 
Based upon the cascade of uncertainties 
associated with the suite of analytic tools (BLT, 
thermal, and structural, etc.) for both the 
windward acreage tiles and the wing leading 
edge RCC panels, the decision was made by the 
MMT to utilize the ISS robotic arm to locate an 
astronaut near the gap fillers for removal during 
extravehicular activity (EVA) #3.  The decision 
to attempt a repair was made easier by a well 
thought out operational plan that provided 
assurance that any safety concerns were 
minimized.  Prior planning and forethought on 
how to secure an astronaut to the boom and the 
dynamics of moving a relatively large object around, and in close proximity to, the lower surface of the 
Orbiter alleviated most MMT concerns.  Figure 9 shows photographs from this unprecedented EVA repair, 
in which Steve Robinson was able to easily and safely pull out both gap fillers. 
During the discussion leading up to the decision to repair or not, some concern was raised about what 
if the gap fillers do not come out very easily.  A back-up plan to utilize a makeshift hand saw to cut the gap 
filler down to the surface was adopted.  The BLT Tool output was utilized to recommend the maximum 
height at which transition would occur no earlier than Mach 18 (0.4 in., see Figs. 6 and 7 for the height 
corresponding to the red Keq = 0.250-in line).  As it turned out, Steve Robinson had no trouble removing the 
gap fillers by hand, at one point mentioning that it took less than a pound and half of force to pull one of 
them out.  As the gap fillers were being removed, red adhesive, which is supposed to be along the bottom 
edge of the gap fillers, could be seen smeared across the side.  Having the adhesive along the side of the 
gap filler, with repeated exposures to higher temperatures, could compromise bonding integrity.  
Entry IR 
To supplement the limited number of discrete instrumentation on Orbiter Vehicle (OV)-103 (to be 
discussed subsequently), high altitude aircraft equipped with long range infrared (IR) imaging systems 
were to be used to obtain global aeroheating images during entry, hopefully near the time of transition.  
Previous attempts at imaging the Shuttle windward surface using IR had been attempted, initially using 
aircraft (STS-3)8 and then ground-based systems (STS-969 and STS-10310).  The current attempt was to take 
advantage of existing airborne assets to fly above the weather (mainly humidity) and minimize the slant 
range between the imaging system and the Orbiter.  As depicted in Fig. 10, the two NASA WB-57 Ascent 
Video Experiment (WAVE) aircraft used during launch and a Missile Defense Agency Gulfstream II, 
referred to as HALO (High Altitude Observatory), aircraft were placed along the ground path at key points 
in the trajectory.  The WB-57 is able to fly at an altitude of 60 kft., while the HALO flies at 48 kft.  Based 
upon the BLT analysis of transition onset once the two large gap fillers were removed, transition was 
expected to be fairly nominal.  The three 
aircraft were staged at Mach 7, 9, and 11, 
initially, in hopes of capturing an image 
showing a turbulent wedge (thus providing 
confirmation of the turbulent spreading 
angle and a direct indication of the 
source).  Unfortunately due to weather 
concerns at the runway, reentry was waved 
off a total of 4 times over two days for 
landing at KSC until the final divert to 
Edwards Air Force Base in California.  
Naturally, the aircraft were not able to 
relocate in time to acquire these important 
images during the early morning landing 
on the west coast.  
Figure 10. Pre-flight plan for entry IR image capture 
 
 
Figure 9. Removal of protruding gap fillers during 
EVA 3 
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Post-Flight 
Transition Onset (TC Data) 
Discovery (OV-103) has the 
fewest number of windward 
surface thermocouples of all the 
vehicles in the fleet, a total of five 
working thermocouples for this 
flight.  A few weeks were 
required to retrieve and process 
the data from the Modular 
Auxiliary Data System (MADS), 
and the resulting temperature-
time histories and transition onset 
times are indicated in Fig. 11.  
Relatively speaking, the transition 
onset time for this flight is 
considered nominal, with 
transition occurring at a Mach 
number below 8. 
Port side thermocouple 
(9711) showed the earliest transition onset time of 1230s.  The central thermocouples showed a rapid 
movement of transition from the back to the front of 1265s to 1270s, respectively.  It is interesting to note 
that if the entry imaging aircraft had been in position for the landing at Edwards, then it is likely one of the 
IR systems would have captured the transition process.  Clear evidence of cause and effect and 
confirmation of the turbulent spreading angle would have been useful information for this post-flight 
assessment of STS-114. 
Post-Flight Runway Inspection 
The post-flight runway TPS inspection team at Edwards found nine additional gap fillers protruding, as 
noted in Fig. 12.  These nine gap fillers had not been previously identified in orbit during the RPM 
photographic analysis.  So the obvious question arises, why were these gap fillers not identified?  Were the 
additional gap fillers too small to be noticed during the RPM process, or did they in fact protrude during 
entry or upon landing? 
Only three of the gap 
fillers identified as 
protruding on the 
runway were noted as 
potentially being out 
during the high heating 
portion of the trajectory 
due to the resulting flow 
pattern and burn marks 
around the trip.  Of 
those three, only two 
have been since 
confirmed as protruding 
prior to entry from a 
more thorough review 
of the RPM photos.  
These two were small 
enough, both protruding 
0.1-in or less, that they 
were missed during the 
mission. 
 
Fig. 11 Thermocouple locations for OV-103 and transition onset 
times for STS-114 
 
 
Figure 12. Protruding gap fillers on STS-114 
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Final BLT Analysis 
Figure 13 provides the BLT 
Tool analysis results for all 11 
protruding gap fillers identified 
in Fig. 12.  Several of the gap 
fillers were in a position such 
that if they were indeed out 
during entry, the onset of 
transition would not have been 
picked up by the thermocouples 
(GF3, 4, 5, 7, and 8).  If the 
airborne IR imaging systems had 
been in place for this entry, the 
earlier transition wedges missed 
by the lack of windward surface 
thermocouples could have been 
confirmed or refuted.  The most 
intriguing gap filler is GF6 as it’s 
location and height would 
suggest a transition onset time near what was actually identified with the STS-114 flight data, with the 
possible exception of the most forward thermocouple (9468).  Alternatively, based on the BLT assessment 
of Site 942-01 (shown earlier), transition movement down the center of the fuselage, as indicated by the 
rapid forward progression of transition onset from TC9590 to TC9468 (within 5 seconds), may have been 
due to the cavity on the nose landing gear door.  The slightly earlier transition onset time on the port wing 
(TC9711, roughly 30 seconds earlier than on centerline) may have been due to GF6.  The noted rapid 
movement of transition tends to rule out an alternate explanation of nominal transition due to the 
distributed background roughness of the TPS (steps and gaps).  Based on the computed movement of a 
constant value of Re#/Me, transition onset would move more slowly across the four central thermocouples 
(on the order of 100s). 
Implications for STS-121 
Post-flight, a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the BLT Tool as implemented for STS-114 has 
uncovered the necessity to develop a new version where the computational database is based on CFD 
instead of engineering solutions.  This will remove the limitation of the computational method beyond 
Mach 20.  However, the lack of any high Mach number transition data for calibration purposes will 
continue to limit the range of the tool.  The next version of the tool will include additional ground-based 
data at Mach numbers up to 16 (obtained in the CUBRC LENS facilities in Buffalo, NY), as well as any 
additional existing flight cases that have been identified as quality calibration cases.  Also, further 
refinement of the experimental databases obtained at NASA Langley Research Center facilities will 
continue.  In the meantime, a case should be made to utilize an up-coming flight to include a controlled 
high Mach number transition experiment for reducing uncertainties regarding real-gas effects on the 
transition process at high Mach numbers. 
On the vehicle processing side, a gap filler assessment group was established to determine the root 
causes for the gap filler protrusions during STS-114 in order to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence 
during up-coming missions.  As mentioned earlier, sidewall bonding was identified as a significant issue as 
the adhesive material that is smeared closer to the surface will be exposed to higher temperatures, thereby 
reducing long-term strength of bond.  Pull tests on a random selection of gap fillers on the vehicles revealed 
this to be an issue of concern and that many of the gap fillers in place may be of questionable capacity.  
Therefore, the decision was made by the Space Shuttle Program to replace all gap fillers on the vehicles (a 
major undertaking), using an improved installation process and new pull test standard, as soon as possible 
to reduce likelihood of future protrusions.  Due to the shear number of gap fillers to be replaced on each 
vehicle (roughly 15,800 as shown in Fig. 14), the lower surface was broken up into priority zones.  Gap 
fillers within the Priority 1 zone were required to be replaced before the next flight, as this area had the 
biggest influence on the wing leading edge, both from a heating perspective as well as a debris source (gap 
 
Fig. 13 BLT analysis of the gap fillers post-flight 
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filler liberation and subsequent 
impact on the wing leading 
edge).  The remaining zones 
were to be completed as soon as 
possible, but if not done prior to 
launch the program recognizes 
that additional EVA’s may be 
required as risk mitigation. 
Summary 
To support the Shuttle RTF 
effort, a predictive tool was 
developed for estimating the 
onset of boundary layer transition 
from deviations to the OML.  
The BLT Tool is the first step in 
the analysis process of the local 
TPS aerothermodynamics in 
order to allow informed disposition of damage for making recommendations to fly as is or to repair.  This 
tool was developed in time to be implemented for the first RTF mission, STS-114, and thus was utilized 
during the decision process to send an astronaut out to remove the two protruding gap fillers of concern that 
were identified during the mission.  Once these large gap fillers were removed the remaining damage sites 
were all cleared for reentry as is.  Post-flight analysis of the resulting entry transition onset data revealed 
good comparison of the predicted times to that measured by the surface thermocouples, based on the 
remaining damage site on the nose landing gear door and a possible gap filler that was protruding on the 
runway, but can not be confirmed to be out prior to entry.  Finally, a discussion of improvements to the 
BLT Tool for reducing uncertainties and to vehicle processing for reducing the likelihood of future gap 
filler protrusions was provided. 
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